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Introduction
China is clearly a latecomer as a global investor: the stock of its outward foreign direct investments (FDI) accounts for less than 1 per cent of world FDI stock, and lags behind the world average in terms of ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) (UNCTAD, 2009) The mixed expectations related to China's overseas expansion calls for a better understanding and knowledge of the strategies of Chinese companies entering overseas markets to inform what is becoming an increasingly relevant debate. Although this topic is becoming fashionable in international business studies 3 , the empirical evidence on Chinese FDI in European countries is quite limited and relates mainly to the UK (Burghart and Rossi, 2009; Cross and Voss, 2008; Liu and Tian, 2008) and Germany (Schüller and Turner, 2005; Schüler-Zhou and Schüller, 2009 ). This paper contributes by analysing the case of Italy.
1 The official data are from MOFCOM's Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, first published in 2003. These statistics underestimate the real value of investments because they do not include the financial sector and are based on the value arising from approval procedures rather than the effective value of bids (thus excluding non-approved investments and private transactions not formally recorded). In addition, these data do not account for most M&A activity since this is often financed through foreign banks and thus not recorded in Chinese balance-of-payments information. Notwithstanding these limitations, MOFCOM data represent the most up-to-date source of information on Chinese FDI, disaggregated by destination country and sector. 2 The largest part of Chinese FDI goes to Asia, mainly Hong Kong, which absorbs more than half of the country's total stock. 3 See, e.g., the books by Alon and McIntyre (2008) , Alon et al. (2009) and Larçon (2009) In terms of stock, Italy is ranked seventh among the countries of Europe (excluding Russia). It is an especially interesting case for analysis because of the peculiarity of its economic system, which shares some features of the Chinese economy: strong presence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) specialized in 'traditional' industries (Amighini and Chiarlone, 2005) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on the motivations behind Chinese FDI, Section 3 gives some background information on Italy as a location for FDI, Section 4 focuses on Chinese FDI in Italy and explores motivations and entry strategies, and Section 5 concludes.
Motivations for Chinese FDI
Much of the work that investigates the motivations for FDI refer to the four categories identified out by Dunning (1993) : natural resource-seeking; defensive (to secure a position into a market) and offensive (to invest into new markets) market-seeking; strategic asset-seeking (to acquire technologies, managerial capabilities, brands, distribution channels and other tacit assets); and efficiency-seeking (to exploit economies of scale and scope and/or to secure access to cheaper input factors, especially labour).
In the 2006 World Investment Report, UNCTAD identifies market-, efficiencyand natural resource-seeking as the most relevant motives for FDI from emerging countries to less developed destinations, and market-and strategic asset-seeking as the main attractors in developed countries (UNCTAD, 2006) .
Natural resource-seeking has been the main motivation for Chinese FDI since the country started to invest abroad and its importance has risen with the country's exceptional economic growth. Chinese MNEs have targeted resource-rich developing countries in Africa and Latin America, to satisfy the country's 'hunger' for natural resources (Trinh et al., 2006) . Most Chinese FDI in Africa is by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) searching for unexplored reserves, often tying investments to government aid programmes (Cai, 1999; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009) , especially in politically risky domestic environments (e.g. Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe). In some cases SOEs, enjoying access to cheaper capital and relying on longer-term strategies than their rivals, identify risky investments with the opportunity to achieve high rates of return, rather than seeing the volatile political conditions of some African countries as a constraint (Alden and Davies, 2006) .
Chinese market seeking investments are common in both developing and developed countries. One of the main reasons for market seeking investments is excessive competition in the domestic market, based on the large number of foreign MNEs entering and investing in China. This has caused profit margins to fall and resulted in overcapacity in some mature industries, such as textiles and clothing, pushing Chinese firms to find new markets overseas by establishing local sales and distribution centres, but also overseas production bases (Chen and Lin, 2006; OECD, 2008) . In some cases, market-seeking investments also reflect a strategy of taking advantage of preferential access to the developed-country market (e.g. investments in
Turkey aimed at the EU market, and investments in Sub-Saharan African countries to enjoy preferential treatment from developed markets in textiles) (OECD, 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009 (Cross and Voss, 2008) .
Further empirical evidence of these motivations is provided by case-studies on the white goods sector (Bonaglia et al., 2007) and on well known Chinese MNEs such as Haier, Lenovo, BOE and TCL (Li, 2007; Liu and Buck, 2009 Analysing the entry choices of Chinese firms investing abroad, Cui and Jiang (2009) use survey data on a sample of 138 companies and show econometrically that wholly-owned subsidiaries are preferred when assetseeking motivations prevail and the host industry market is highly competitive, while joint ventures are chosen to establish first-or early-mover advantages in high growth foreign markets. Size is also shown to influence entry mode with large companies more likely to choose wholly-owned subsidiaries, while joint ventures are preferred as a means to penetrate cultural barriers and offset regulatory institutional barriers. Using Chery as a case study, Zhang and Filippov (2009) show that young, dynamic, private companies, lacking easy access to government support, find it profitable to start their internationalization through strategic alliances followed by direct investments.
Still on the choice of the entry mode, Liu and Tian (2008) note that the choice of a wholly-owned subsidiary contrasts somewhat with mainstream theory that firms should choose minority equity entry modes in more culturally distant countries (Kogut and Singh, 1988 
Italy as a location for Chinese FDI
Italy traditionally has not been attractive as a destination for foreign investment: according to UNCTAD (2008) In terms of attractions, the results of a survey conducted by the Bank of Italy on foreign investors stress the importance of the size of the domestic market and the lower labour costs relative to other EU countries (Committeri, 2004) .
Also, a recent empirical analysis shows that strong location advantages linked to local specialization among agglomerations of firms are attractive to FDI in the same sectors (Bronzini, 2007) . Italy is specialized in such sectors as automotive, textiles and clothing, machinery and home appliances, and we would argue that this specialization may indeed be an attractor for multinationals from emerging countries, such as China, which are currently trying to upgrade their production and technological capabilities and build their own global champions in these industries. This is confirmed by the increasing presence in Italy of investors from emerging economies in these sectors highlighted by Mariotti and Mutinelli (2008) , based on firm level data from the ICE-Reprint database.
Focusing on Chinese FDI in Italy within a European perspective, Italy ranks 7th with a share of 4.05%, while Germany and the UK account for more than 50 per cent of the total stock of Chinese FDI in Europe in 2008 (Table 1) .
Section 4, based on original empirical evidence, explores the main internationalization characteristics and strategies of Chinese companies operating in Italy. In terms of size of investments, data on employment are available for only 52 of the 68 companies. Table 2 shows that most of companies are small or very small, which is in line with the findings of the survey by Cross and Voss (2008) in the UK that the majority of Chinese operations have less than 25 employees. Note that, with two exceptions, the few companies that employ more than 50 people were all established since 1999 9 . We can obtain some interesting insights from the disaggregation of investments by main activity (Table 4) Source: Authors' database *Classification based on Sturgeon (2008) Chinese investment in Italy has experienced a gradual evolution in entry mode. The first wave of investments in representative offices was characterized mainly by small-scale greenfield investments; this has developed to larger greenfield investments directed to activities such as R&D and marketing. Since 2000 there has been an increase in M&A activity including the acquisition of the motorcycle manufacturers Benelli by Quianjiang, acquisition of Meneghetti and Elba by Haier, and the takeover of Cifa (specialized in the production of machinery for the building sector) by Zoomlion, which so far is the largest acquisition in Italy and the second largest in Europe (Table 5) .
On the basis of the empirical evidence collected, Chinese FDI in Italy present some interesting characteristics in terms of sector specialization, location and recent evolution with regard to activities undertaken and mode of entry. In the next section, we investigate the main motivations behind Chinese investments in Italy, exploiting original empirical evidence collected in indepth interviews with selected companies. 
Why are Chinese companies investing in Italy?
Chinese investments in Europe reflect a sustained effort to enter competitive European markets and get access to superior technologies, know-how and competence (Filippov and Saebi, 2008; Hay et al., 2009; Nicolas, 2009 ). Our research on Italy confirms that the main motivations for Chinese investments in the country are the search for new markets and other trade-related activities (market-seeking), and the search for strategic assets.
Market-seeking investments
With regard to market-seeking investments, since Italy is the seventh largest economy in the world, it represents an important market for foreign investors. Beyond the size of the market, Chinese companies consider Italian consumers to be demanding and particularly sophisticated. Therefore, in sectors such as home appliances the Italian market is seen as a test market for products adapted to European tastes. The location in Italy is strategic in terms of taste and feedback on products.
The predominance of market-seeking investments is confirmed by Table 4 
Haier's and China's interest in Italian industrial districts
The case of Haier in the white goods sector is of particular interest because of its multiple investments in Italy, driven by market-seeking and strategic asset- These acquisitions were motivated on the one hand by the need to overcome EU tariff barriers and on the other by the requirement to improve the capacity to design, develop and manufacture products suitable for the European market, and for the high end of the Chinese import market (Liu and Li, 2002) .
The intention to acquire knowledge and managerial capacity was behind the decision to locate its headquarters in Varese, given the area's strong tradition in white goods manufacture. Varese is home to important companies such as Philips and Whirlpool, and many other firms specialized in components and intermediary phases. The agglomeration of many specialized firms generates positive externalities, arising from the presence of a pool of specialized workers and suppliers and by specialized knowledge on markets and technologies. These agglomeration advantages attracted Haier and influenced its decision to establish its European headquarters there. This is confirmed by Bonaglia et al. (2007) , according to whom one of the lessons emerging from leading white goods manufacturers is that success depends as much on firms' internal resources as it does on the collective efficiency of the clusters in which they operate and are embedded. In fact the choice of an off-shore location is driven both by demand and cost considerations, and by the presence of suppliers of specialized components.
Huawei followed a similar pattern to Haier, although Italy is less central in its
European strategy. Having started out as a distributor for global MNEs in the Chinese market, Huawei based its globalization strategy first on neighbouring countries before entry into Russia and Africa. It extension to more sophisticated markets is designed to raise its international profile (Simmons, 2008) . Since 2000, the company has set up several high value-added activities including R&D, training and design, in several European countries including Sweden, the Netherlands, France and Germany, and has established its regional headquarters in the UK. In Italy, Huawei has invested for market-seeking reasons, to raise its profile and strengthen its brand, and also with the aim of conducting research and product development activities in its recently established research centre in Turin.
Chinese FDI in the automotive sector and the search for design and technological competences
China is investing intensively in the automotive industry, in which Italy has a long tradition. Thanks to rapidly increasing internal demand and to technology transferred from the world's leading manufacturers, producing in China and subcontracting parts and components to domestic suppliers, the Chinese automotive sector has grown very rapidly although it has still to achieve full technological maturity (Amighini, 2008) . Chinese automobile manufacturers have begun to produce vehicles under their own brands, strengthening their capabilities through specialization in niche markets where they do not feel threatened by competitive pressure from large Western players (Altenburg et al., 2008) . Some Chinese car makers have also started to invest overseas by acquiring control in established companies (Noble, 2006 ). An example is the markets. This, however, does not mean that they plan to produce for the European market in the short run, but rather that they are looking for new competences to catch up with the global players or pursue specialization in niche markets.
Brand-seeking FDI
Other relevant strategic asset-seeking investments are those aimed at the acquisition of well-known brands. This is a strategy followed by many emerging country MNEs, given the unfamiliarity of their home brands in foreign countries (Makino et al., 2002) . Because of their specialization in the lowest value-added activities in global value chains, 'becoming original design manufacturers (ODMs) and further progressing into original brand manufacturers (OBMs), either through the firm's own efforts or through brand acquisitions from incumbents, is … the most difficult phase for any latecomer or newcomer MNE' (Bonaglia et al., 2007: 8 
Conclusions
Chinese FDI in Italy is a recent and limited phenomenon, but shows some interesting features. It is expected to increase in the immediate future. As the empirical evidence in this paper has shown, the evolution of the Chinese pattern of entry in Italy is generally in line with the model followed by Chinese firms in other European countries: starting from small-scale operations in trade-related activities, they are evolving towards the acquisition of tangible and intangible resources that are deemed necessary to improve China's presence in international markets and to upgrade its technological and production capacities. 
